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Regulatory policies  differ in many ways.  They affect different individuals  and firms,
they influence different  aspects  of behavior, they  alter conduct and behavior  to varying degrees,
and they employ different methods of oversight and control.  These differences are seldom
arbitrary.  The purpose of this paper is to trace differences  in regulatory policies  to differences
in: (1) the objectives and resources of the regulator; (2) the institutions of the jurisdiction in
which regulation is imposed;  and (3) the characteristics  of the industry for which regulation is
contemplated.  Each of these factors will be shown to influence the distinguishing  features of
regulatory policy in important  ways.
To delineate more precisely  the key dimensions  along which regulatory policies differ,
a form, function, and scope trichotomy  will be employed throughout the ensuing discussion.
The form of regulation encompasses  the procedures  employed to design and enforce regulatory
rules, the nature of these rules, and the locus of decision-making  authority in the regulatory
arena,  e.g.,  whether the regulator makes and enforces all  relevant decisions, or  whether
considerable decision-making  authority is delegated to the regulated entities.  The function  of
regulation refers to its basic purpose.  For instance, some regulations are designed to enCure
safety, others to secure production  at minimum  cost, and still others to provide information  to
consumers.  The scope of regulation refers to the extent of regulatory oversight and control.
Regulation  can  be  all-encompassing, imposing strict  rules  on  all  relevant  activities.
Alternatively, regulation  can merely suggest  guidelines  for a small subset of relevant activities.
To reiterate, this paper will focus  on explaining  how differences  in regulatory  objectives
and resources, social institutions,  and indust-y  characteristics  influence  the form, function, and
scope of regulatory policy.2
It is important  to note at the outset the great variety of regulations  that is observed in
practice.  Price, quality, information disclosure, and compatibility regulations are  common
examples.  Price regulation often places an upper bound on the price of a product.  Quality
regulation can entail the specification of a minimum  level of quality that must be achieved.
Regulation of information disclosure can require producers to  accurately describe the  key
features of their products.  Compatibility regulation  can require manufacturers  of similar or
compVementary  products (e.g., computer  hardware  and software)  to design their products so that
consumers  can easily substitute  the product  of one manufacturer  for that of another manufacturer
when assembling  a good (like a computer system)  that has multiple  component  parts.
The variety of regulations arises in part from the many different functions  or purposes
of regulation. In some  instances, product safety  is paramount  (e.g., the purity of food products),
while in other instances, product price is the central concern (e.g., the amount consumers pay
for L'asic  telephone  service). Even when regulations  have  the same  purpose, though, their forms
can differ. To illustrate, the methods employed  to ensure  reasonable  b;  not exorbitant  financial
returns to producers  of commodities  like electricity  and telecommunications  services  differ across
countries and across iurisdictions  within some  countries. Rate of return regulation  with little or
no pricing flexibility  is a common form of regulation. It generally  involves setting prices for
all of a firm's products  to generate a predetermined  return on investment  for the producer. Price
cap regulation is another form of  regulation that is gaining popularity.  Under price  cap
regulation, the prices  charged by  the  regulated firm for its  services must not  exceed  a
prespecified  level on average, but the firm has significant  freedom to set individual  prices.
The explanation  of differences  among  regulatory  policies  begins in section  2 with a more3
comp'ete description  of the form, function,  and scope  of regulation. The three key factors t'"t
underlie differences in regulatory form, function, and scope are then analyzed in sections 3
through 5.  Concluding  2houghts  are offered in section 6.
Before proce!eding,  some  caveats  are in order.  First, space and time constraints  preclude
a complete explanation of all relevant differences  in regulatory policy across all jurisdictions.
Only some of the key deterr inants of certain aspects of regulatory policy will be discussed.
Thoughts on  relevant considerations that receive insufficient attention here are presented in
section 6.  Second, while there are a great variety of settings  in which regulators interact with
regulatees, all such settings are not analyzed in detail here.  For the most part, attention is
restricted.  to the common  setting in which "the regulator" is a government  official (or body of
officials) charged with establishing  rules to govern economic activities  in one sector of society.
The classic example is one where the regulator is a public utility commission  that sets rules
which govern  the  operation of  a  regulated firm,  such  as  a  producer of  electricity or
telecommunications  services.
Finally,  this research is  not intended as a  summary of  the econo)mic  literature on
regulation.  While some references to  the literature are provided. the references are  not
systeli.dtic,  and they are relatively  few ir. number. The main purpose of this paper is to provide
one perspective  policymakers  might  find helpful  when  deciding  whether  regulation  is appropriate
for the  environment in  which they operate, and,  if  so,  what form of  regulation is  most
appropriate.
2.  Differences Among Regulatory Regimes.
The purpose of this section  is simply  to describe in more detail the three key dimensions4
in which regulatory  policies  differ: form, function,  and scope. The discussion  begins with t-
form of regulatory  policy.
A.  RLgulatory Form: Centralized  versus Delegated Decision-Making.
As  illustrated  in  the  introduction,  common  regulations  have  many  different
characteristics. Some  set limits on the price that can be charged for a product while others set
minimum  quality or compatibility standards.  These different aspects of regulatory form are
intimately  linked  to differences  in regulatory goals and objectives, which  are analyzed  in section
4.  To briefly foreshadow  the discussion in section 4, consider a setting where the regulator's
primary goal is to assure that a high-quality product is delivered to consumers.  In such a
setting, regulations  that are imposed will likely specify a minimum  quality level that must be
achieved. Thus, the form of regulatory policy often follows  directly from regulatory  goals.
A more subtle  aspect of the form regulations  take is the extent to which  decision-making
is delegated. Command-and-control  regulation  represents  one extreme  on .his  dimension. Under
command-and-control  regulation, the regulator dictates in great detail the actions the regulated
firm must undertake.  For instance, in a setting where water purification  and delivery are
regulated, the regulator might dictate the exact details of the purification  process, the rate at
which  water is purified,  the type  of pump and conduit  used in water delivery,  and the exact  price
at *vhich  water is sold to all customers.  Similarly, in regulating  the provision  of taxi service in
a large city, the regulator  might dictate the number and type of vehicles  an authorized supplier
of taxi service  must own, the number of taxis that must be on the road at each moment  in time,
each vehicle's service 2nd repair requirements, the type of dispatch system that must be
employed,  the qualifications  of drivers, and the price of taxi service.5
In  contrast to  such  command-and-control  regulation,  the  regulator may  delegate
considerable  discretion to the regulated firm.  To iilustrate, consider again the setting where
water purification  and delivery are regulated.  The regulator who merely states the level of
purity del; ered water must achieve and the price at which water must be delivered  delegates
considerable  discretion to the regulated  firm. The firm is free to choose the purification  process
it prefers and the delivery  system it finds to be most effective. Similarly, if the regulator  of taxi
service only specifies that quick, courteous and safe transportation must be provided at a
specified  price, the taxi company is left with considerable  discretion regarding its method of
operation. The company  can decide which types of vehicles  to purchase (or lease), how often
to service and repair the vehicles, how many drivers to hire,  the necessary training ano
qualifications  of drivers, anc' the method of dispatching  taxis.
In  many instances, ii.centive regulation involves delegating decision-making  to  the
regulated firm.  Goals or targets are usually set under incentive regulation, and the firm is
rewarded according to how its realized performance compares with the established targets.
When the firrn's final performance  is monitored  but its exact method  of operation  is not dictated,
decision-making  authority is delegated to the firm.  One form of incentive  regulation that has
gained popularity  in the telecommunications  industries  of Great Bri!ain  and the United States in
recent years is price cap regulation. Under (pure)  price cap regulaion, the average price level
at which the firm sells its services is restricted, but the firm has considerable  latitude  in setting
individual  prices and in determining  how to provide services at minimum  cost.
Other forms of regulation also delegate considerable discretion to the regulated firm.
Potential regulation is an example.  Potential regulation refers to  a  regime in  which no6
restrictions are placed on a firm's activities unless the firm's  performance is judged to be
unsatisgactory  according  to some prespecified  criterion.  To illustrate, a regulator rnay allow a
firm to provide services  and set prices in any way it sees fit, provided the firm's cliswomers  are
satisfied with  .he  services  they receive. However, if a sufficient number  of customers  complain
and ask for regulatory  intervention,  the regulator will investigate  the reported  dissati.faction,  and
force the firrn .-.  remedy  any problems  Lhat  are discovered. 1 In such  a setting,  the primary
monitors of a firm's performance  are its customers.  If the firm can satisfy these monitors, it
can avoid direct regulatory  scrutiny and control.
Considerable  discretion  is also awarded to the regulated  firm when the regulator  conducts
reactive rather than  proactive policy.  Under reactive policy, the regulated  firm first proposes
or undertakes  an action, and the reguiator subsequently  approves or disapproves  of the action.
In contrast, under proactive  regulatory  policy, the regulator states in advance  which  actions  will
be approved, and which  actions  will not be permnitted.  To illustrate, a reactive regulatory  policy
would be one in which a regulator  reserves the right to approve or disapprove  of new drugs, but
places no restrictions on the types of drugs a firm can research and manufacture  ex ante.  A
proactive regulatory policy would restrict the type of research the firm could conduct and/or
would state in advance  that drugs with certain characteristics  (e.g., drugs that induce  abortions)
will not be approved.
Decision-making  authority is not the only authority that can be delegated to regulated
firms: rule-making  authority  can be similarly  delegated. Many professions  set standards  for their
members.  For instance, medical  associations  regularly specify licensing  requirements  for their
members, determine which training institutions are accredited, and discipline members who7
violate  the rules or ethics of the association. In such instances,  the primary (potential)  regulator
(e.g., the government)  authorizes  a substitute  regulator to set rules and regulations, rather thaa
doing so direc.ly.
One final aspect of  regulatory form is the manner in  which rules are designed and
enforced. Policy design can proceed behind  closed  doors or in open public hearings. It can also
be influenced  by formal or informal communication  between the regulator and the firm.  The
regulator  may monitor the firm's p'rformance and verify directly  tdat regulatory edicts  are being
followed. Alternatively,  the customers  of the regulated  firm may be called upon to monitor the
firm's performance (as under potential  regulation, for example).
B.  Regulatory  Function: Ynforming  versus Enforcing Regulation.
Function is a second dimension on which regulatory policies differ.  There are many
ways in which the function or purpose of regulation Lan differ.  For instance, the primary
purpose of a regulation  can be to protect consumers  from unsafe products, or to ensure that all
customers  are treated in similar fashion. Regulations  can also be designed primarily  to limit the
profits of  a  monopoly producer, or  to  control vaiious aspects of  the  interactions among
producers. Like re£ latory form, regulatory  function  is often intimately  linked to the goals and
objectives  of the regulator.  This link is described in more detail in section 4.
One element of regulatory function that will receive particular attention in the ensuing
discussion is the extent to which regulations serve to inform consumers about the regulated
firm's activities, rather than dictate which activities  will be allowed.  A primary example of
informing regulation is  the  requirement that  manufacturers of  food  products list  all  the
ingredients  contained in their products.  In contrast, enforcing  regulation in the food industry8
might involve prohibitions  against  the use of certain chemicals in foods.  A secoald  exalrple of
the difference between informing  and enforcing regulation can be  aken from the computer
industry. L-forming  regulation  might  simply  require each manufacturer  to specify  the interfacing
capability of  its  products, and  to  list  the  products of  rival  producers with  which the
manufacturer's  product is compatible. Enforcing  regulation, in contrast, might  impose  industry-
wide compatibility  standards,  requiring  all manufact rers to adopt standard  interface  capabilities.
The key distinction  between  informing  and enforcing  regulation is the discietion  afforded
consumers. Informing  regulation  enables  consumers  to make well-informed  choices. Enforcing
regulation makes choices for corsumers.  As will be explained shortly, the choice between
irnforming  and enforcing regulation  depends in  par, on  the relative costs of acquiring and
processing information  for the r!gulator and for consumers.
C.  Regulatory Scope: Comprehensive versus Partial  Regulation.
Regulatory  scope is a third dimension  on which regulatory policies  differ.  The scope  of
regulation can be viewed  as the extent  to which regulation is comprehensive,  i.e., the extent to
which  it  encompasses all  of  the  regulated firm's  activities.  In  some industries, like
telecommunications,  comprehensive  regulation  is common. The regulator generally  controls the
prices charged by the telecommunications  provider, limits the firm's eamings, monitors the
quality of the rirm's products, oversees  the firm's major investments,  and dictates the markets
in which the firm is allowed to operate. In othe: industries, like pharmaceuticals,  regulation  is
often more p-  'al,  and less comprehensive. The safety of drugs is often regulated, but drug
prices are not usually regulated,  and neither are the earnings of pharmaceutical  companies.
In settings with multiple  suppliers  of  product, the scope of regulatory  control can also9
vary according to the number of suppliers that are regulated,  and the extent to which they ate
regulated. In some  industries  like telecornmunicatio.ss  and electric  power generation, all aspects
of the operatVons  of large (dominant)  firms are often regulated,  while  similar activities  of smaller
firms  are either not regulated  at all, or are regulated  less stringently. For instance, in the United
States, the prices charged by AT&T for telecommunications  services are regulated by the
Federal Communications  Commission. In contrast, the pricei charged by its main compedtors
(MCI and Sprint) are not regulated.
Having identified some of the key dimensions  in which regulatory policies differ, it
remains  to explain  why regulation  diffirs along these  dimensions. Three key explanatory  factors
are described in detail in the next three sections.
3.  The Regulator's Objectives an,! Resources.
The purpose of  this section is to explain how the objectives of a  regulator and the
resources at his (or her) disposal influence the type of regulatory policy that is likely to be
implemented.
A.  Regulator's  Objectives.
To begin, consider how the regulator's objectives  influence the design of regulatory
policy.  Regulatory goals and objectives can vary widely, and often have direct bearing on
regulatory  policy. The ensuing  discussion  cites six common  goals  and explains  their implications
for regulatory  policy.
Al.  Foster Industry Development and Investment.
A common goal of regulators is to foster development  of the industry they regulate. 210
Often. regulated industries are central to the development  of other industries.  For instance a
modern, full-service telecommunications  system is crucial to the successful operation of the
financial  sector of a country. There are many ways  a regulator  can foster industry  development.
For example, using command-and-control  regulation,  the regulator can mandate the adoption  of
operating equipment  and techniques  (e.g., nuclear power plants or fiber-optic  telephone  cable)
that have proved successful  elsewhere. Alternatively,  the regulator might delegate the choice
of technology  to the regulated  firm, but promise substantial  returns for any new investment  in
the industry that improves  industry  performance. 3
A2.  Ensure Safe, High-Quality  Service.
Safety is of paramount concern in some industries.  When electricity is generated by
nuclear power, for example, it is critical that the generation process proceed safely.  High-
quality service is also important in many settings. For instance, it is important that the water
supplied  in municipal  water systems  be purified  completely. Safety and high-quality  service  can
be promoted through command-and-control  regulation if the regulator dictates operation and
performance  standards and enforces  these standards. Alternatively,  the regulator might only set
targets for product quality and operational  safety, and penalize or reward the regulated firm
according to how its realized performance  compares  to the established targets.
A3.  Promote Least-Cost Production.
To provide service to customers  at reasonable  prices, a regulator will commonly  strive
to ensure  that production occurs as cheaply as possible.  Least-cost production can be fostered
by careful scrutiny of the operations and financial records of  the regulated firm and/or by11
providing financial  incentives for the firm to reduce operating  costs.  For instance, price c"n
regulation  can provide strong incentives  for least-cost  production. Under price-cap  regulation,
the prices a firm i3 allowed to charge for its products are not tied to realized production costs.
Consequently,  if the firm succeeds at reducing  its operating costs, it is not required to pass all
of the cost savings on to consumers in the form of lower prices.  Such a policy can provide
strong incentives  for least-cost  production.
A4.  Achieve  Desired Consumption  Levels.
Regulatory  policy  can influence  which  parties consume  regulated  products, and how much
they consume. Prices can influence  consumption,  as can regulatory  mandates  to consume or to
refrain from consuming  a product.  Information  provided by the regulator or by the firm at the
regulator's insistence  can also influence  consumption  levels. Sometimes,  a regulator may wish
to increase  consumption  of a commodity,  like vaccines  against  communicable  diseases, or public
(as opposed to  private) transportation.  In  other instances, a  regulator may prefer  that
consumption  of products like addictive drugs, pornography, or ozone-depleting  chemicals be
reduced. Different regulatory  policies can be employed to promote these varied goals.
AS.  Promote  More Equitable  OAtcomes.
Redistribution  of income can also be a goal of regulators. To illustrate, there has been
a conscious policy in many countries to subsidize  local telephone  service with revenues from
long-distance  telephone service.  Similarly, business customers  are often charged more than
residential customers for similar  telephone service.  One reason for these policies is  to
effectively  redistribute income from individuals  with greater wealth (e.g., owners of business12
enterprises and citizens  who can afford to make  long-distance  telephone  calls) to individuals  w  h
less wealth.
A6.  Limit the Earnings of Producers.
Redistribution  of income from producers to consumers  of regulated  products is another
common regulatory goal.  In industries  where technological  considerations  (i.e., economies  of
scale) render production by a single producer most economical,  a key charge of regulators is
often to limit the abuse of monopoly  power by the single regulated  producer.  To limit the
exercise of  monopoly power,  a  regulator will generally force prices below the levels an
unregulated  monopolist  would charge.
Each of these six goals and objectives  has obvious implications  for the form, function,
and scope of regulatory  policy.  Some  of these implications  have already been cited.  Important
complications can arise, though, when the regulator pursues more than one of  these goals
simultaneously. To illustrate, suppose  the regulator  wishes  to limit the earnings of the regulated
producer while fostering  investment  in the regulated  industry. The two goals can conflict, since
attractive financial  returns must be promised  if private investors  are to be induced to invest in
the regulated  industry.  As an additional  illustration,  the goals of quality enhancement  and cost
minimization  can also conflict.  Often, higher quality service is more costly to provide, so the
regulator may have to implement  a compromise  between  high quality and low cost.
The exact compromise that will result when regulatory  goals conflict will depend on the
relative importance of the conflicting goals.  For instance, when technological  progress and
infrastructure development in an industry (like telecommunications)  is considered paramount,13
and when the pressure to limit the earnings of the regulated  firm is not great, the regulator will
be inclined to permit substantial  returns on new investment.
A  key  determinant of  the  relative  importance of  regulatory goals is  the  likely
consequences  of failing to achieve the various goals.  If the failure to meet a particular goal
would have  a substantial,  obvious, immediate,  and adverse  impact, the regulator  will likely  give
that goal a high priority. For instance, if a malfunction  at a nuclear power  plant would have a
widespread negative impact  on society, a regulator might be willing  to incur great expense to
ensure safe operation  of the nuclear plant, even though doing so would resi"ft  in higher prices
for electricity.
Observed regulatory policy will also vary over time as differen i  ;  of su:cess at
achieving various goals are realized.  This is the case even if regulatory  goals ao nlot  change
over time.  To illustrate, suppose it is considered very important  both to ensure the provision
of high-quality  service  and to promote least-cost  production. Initially  the regulator might focus
on the former objective, and subsidize  investment and research and development  to enhanc  -
product  quality,  even  though  doing so initially  results in higher operating  costs. Once  reasonable
quality levels are achieved, the regulator might redirect attention toward reducing  production
costs, perhaps  by implementing  a form of regulation  (like price cap regulation)  that can provide
strong  incentives  for cost reduction. This sequential  approach  to meeting  multiple  objectives  can
be particularly effective  when progress in achieving  the first goal (e.g., establishing  a modem
telecommunications  network)  enhances  progress in achieving  subsequent  goals  (e.g., improving
the operations of the financial  sector of the economy).'14
B.  Regulator's Resources.
Now consider how the resources available to the regulator can influence regulatory
policy.  Relevant  resources include the size, the educational  training, and the experience  of the
regulatory  staff.  A large, well-trained,  and experienced  staff can enable regulators to research
and better understand  the environment  in which  they  operate. Detailed  information  about current
operating technologies, potential alternative technologies, and consumer preferences is often
required to design effective regulatory policy.  Substantial  information  about the performance
of the regulated  firm (e.g., realized earnings, product quality,  and customer satisfaction)  is also
required in many settings to implement  and enforce regulatory  policy.
Limited information  about the regulated  industry  can influence the form, function, and
scope of the regulator's operations.  In particular, when the regulator's information  is limited,
command-and-control  regulation may be inferior to regulation in which substantial  decision-
maldng  authority  is delegated  to the (better-informed)  regulated  firrr. Furthermore, the regulator
may achieve his goals more effectively if  he allows market forces, rather than regulatory
mandate, to govern  some dimensions  of the firm's operations. To illustrate, consider  an industry
characterized  by rapid technological  change, frequent development  of new products, and rapidly
changing needs of  customers.  In  such an industry (perhaps like the telecommunications
industry), it will be difficult for a regulator to determine  the least-cost means of operation and
the most desired array of products, particularly if the regulator's support staff is limited in
numbers  and training.  Consequently,  any attempt by the regulator to micro-manage  the firm's
production techniques, its product offerings, and its pricing decisions through command-and-
control regulation  may result in substantially  lower performance  than what could be achieved15
with complete information  about the firm's operations.
To reap some  of the benefits  that would  be available if the regulator had access  to critical
information, the regulator  can often employ the superior information  of the regulated  firm. He
can do so by delegating  some  decision-making  authority to the firm. To illustrate,  the regulator
might grant the firm considerable  pricing flexibility  on new services, provided  the firm makes
all of the services it currently offers available to customers at existing prices.  Such a policy
ensures the range of consumption  opportunities  available to customers  is not reduced, and may
be increased. 5 Subject  to maintaining  current product offering, the regulated  firm can employ
its superior information  to determine which products will best serve customers' needs while
providing additional net revenues for the firm.  In a setting where the regulated firm faces
competition  on some services, the pricing flexibility afforded the firm can also enable the firm
to better cope with competitive  pressures.
As another illustration,  a regulator with limited knowledge  of the firm's capabilities  can
allow thea  firm to use its superior  information  to choose among compensation  arrangements. For
instance, suppose the regulator is uncertain of the firm's ability to reduce its production  costs
and, without  jeopardizing  its financial  integrity, lower the prices it charges for its products. If
the  regulator guesses incorrectly that the  firm's  ability is  high and  instructs tie  firm to
implement large price reductions,  the financial viability of the firm may be threatened. The
result may  be a costly  interruption  of high-quality  service to customers (perhaps  because  the firm
is forced to declare bankruptcy). On the other hand, if the regulator adopts the safe strategy  of
enforcing only the small price reductions  that the firm can provide even when its ability is low,
potential  gains for consumers  in the regulated  industry may be foregone.16
To ensure greater gains for consumers  where they are possible  while avoiding  financial
distress for the  regulated firm,  the  regulator can  ol'.r  the  firm a  choice between two
compensation  arrangements. The first would require only minor price reductions, but would
restrict the ability  of the firm to earn large profits. The second arrangement  would  require more
substantial  price reductions, but would also allow the firm to retain more of  the profits it
generates  from reducing  production  costs. A pair of compensation  arrangements  that is carefully
designed along these lines can induce the regulated firm to implement  larger price reductions
when its ability to do so is high, and effect smaller price reductions  when  its ability is low.  The
firm will earn higher profits when its ability is high, but the firm's customers  will also benefit
from the rrore substantial  price reductions  that are implemented  when the firm's ability is high.'
Thus, through well designed delegation of price-setting authority to the party with superior
information,  the firm's performance can be better matched to its ability, and all parties can be
made bette: off.'
In  summary, both the regulator's goals and the resources at his disposal can  have
important  impacts  on the form, function,  and scope  of regulatory  policy. Limited resources can
result in a paucity of information  being available to the regulator. Consequently,  the regulator
may be compelled to delegate decision-making  to the regulated  firm, inducing  the firm to use
its superior  information  to further regulatory  goals to the extent possible. Limited  resources and
information  can also limit the s^ope of activities the regulator  can reasonably  oversee. Specific,
targeted regulatory goals and objectives also  render more appropriate a  limited scope of
regulatory  control. 8 The nature of regulatory  goals (e.g., whether the regulator wishes simply
to inform  consumers  or to enforce particular income distributicns)  can also have a direct impact17
on the function of regulation, and the form it takes.
4.  Institutional  Structure.
The purpose of this section  is to explain  how the institutional  structure  of the environment
in which the regulator operates can influence  the design of regulatory policy.  Two aspects  of
institutional structure are emphasized:  the ability of the regulator te fulfil his promises;  and the
set of complementary  control instruments  that are in force in the environment.
A.  Regulator's Commitment Powers.
Regulatory  po..c; cai only be effective  if it influences  the activities  of the regulated  firm.
To influence the firm's activities, regulatory  policy must create systematic links between the
firm's activities and its financial  well-being. For instance, if regulatory policy  is to ensure high-
quality services, the regulated  firm must expect to suffer financially if it produces low-quality
services.  To  influence the firm's activities, regulatory policy must do more than threaten
financial penalties for undesired  behavior or performance and promise financial rewards for
desired behavior or performance. Regulatory  threats and promises must actually be carried out
as stated if they are to influence  the firm's activities.
To illustrate, suppose  the regulator  promises the regulated firm a higher profit level if
it streamlines its operations  and thereby achieves substantial  cost reductions.  Such a promise
will only  induce the  firm to  reduce costs if  the  promise is  credible.  If  the regulatory
environment  is such that consumers  or other government  officials  will protest vehemently  when
the firm's  profits increase above some normal level and force the regulator to rescind the
promised increase, announced  promises will not induce the desired behavior from the firm.18
Anticipating  that the regulator will ultimately  be unable to fulfil his promises, the firm will rot
act on the initial promise. Similarly, suppose  the regulator threatens severe penalties  should the
firm's operating procedures ever be found unsafe.  Also suppose, though, that the regulator
always gives the firm one more chance to improve its operations when safety violations are
detected, to be suire  the firm's financial  integrity is not  jeopardized by the threatened  penalties.
In such a setting,  the announced  regulatory  policy should  not be expected  to induce  the regulated
firm to improve the safety of its operating procedures.
The ability of a regulator to fulfil the promises he makes is often referred to as the
regulator's commitment  ability.  A regulator's commitment  ability is determined  by a variety of
factors.  The political pressures a regulator faces is one important factor.  If a regulator can
easily be replaced on short notice by his superiors  (e.g., leaders of the executive  or legislative
branch of government),  it may be difficult for the regulator to promise to pursue a policy that
differs from the preferred policy of his superiors.  For instance, although the regulator might
threaten to expose the incumbent producer to competition  if the incumbent's performance is
judged to be inadequate,  the regulator may face great difficulty  in allowing  new entrants into the
marketplace  if the country's governing bodies strongly  oppose competition.
Similarly,  if the regulator is elected directly by citizens at frequent intervals, he may be
hard pressed to implement  policies  that appear contrary to the immediate  interests  of consumers.
For instance, the regulator may have difficulty switching to a new technology  (like nuclear
power generation) that involves large initial investments and substantial price increases for
customers, even though  operating  costs in the distant  future will be lowered sufficiently  to more
than offset the higher initial costs.  If consumers  are myopic and have direct control over the19
regulator's tenure, the regulator may have to adopt a myopic outlook himself if he  -:shes lo
retain his position.
A regulator's commitment  ability  is also affected  by the strength and independence  of the
judicial branch  of  government.  A strong, independent  judiciary can  uphold and support
regulatory decisions that are in the best interest of society, even though they may be unpopular
with consumers or legislative  leaders. 9 To illustrate, consider again the setting where many of
a country's legislators  are firmly  opposed  to allowing  competition  in the regulated  industry,  even
though competition is not explicitly forbidden  under existing law.  Also suppose the judiciary
functions  as an independent  body, and its rulings  are respected  and upheld. Then if the regulator
is elected or appointed for a reasonably long period of time in this setting, he may be able to
introduce competition into the regulated  industry.  On the other hand, if judicial rulings are
ignored or if the judiciary serves only to enforce the whims of the legislative or executive
branches of govemment, then the regulator may find no allies in his quest for competition,  and
so his efforts may be futile.
The  usual  practices and  overall stability of  the govemment can  also  influence a
regulator's commitment ability.  Consider a setting where the regulator wishes to convince
private investors to provide the funds necessary to modernize the production facilities of the
regulated firm.  Investors must anticipate  lucrative returns if they are to provide the requisite
funds.  Such  returns  will not be anticipated despite regulatory promises, though, if  the
govemment is prone to nationalize  successful  private operations or otherwise expropriate large
returns that result from private investment. And even if the govemment  presently in power has
no history of expropriation, when the stability  of the govemment  is in doubt because of strong20
pressure from an opposing  government  that is known  to favor expropriation, investors will he
unlikely to believe regulatory promises of large financial returns.  Consequently,  it may be
impossible for the regulator to attract the investment  he seeks.
Thus, limited  commitment  ability can undermine  the success  of regulatory  policy. It can
also affect the form, function, and scope of  the regulatory policy that is undertaken.  For
instance, a regulator with limited commitment  ability may not solicit construction  funds from
private investors at all.  Any construction that is undertaken  may be financed  entirely by the
government. Similarly,  if the regulator cannot credibly promise either to deliver large returns
to the regulated  firm for outstanding  performance  or to impose large penalties on the firm for
poor performance, the regulator  may not develop far-reaching  incentive  programs in an attempt
to influence the firm's behavior.  Instead, the regulator may attempt to scrutinize  and control
directly the limited number of the firm's  activities that he can monitor, and allow the firm
considerable latitude on other activities.  Alternatively, the regulator may adopt more of an
informing role than an enforcing role, simply providing information to consumers  about the
firm's  activities and its products, and relying on  consumers (and perhaps competitors) to
discipline the regulated firm.  In extreme cases, where limited commitment  ability renders
hollow any promises or  threats made by  the regulator, there is little reason to formulate
regulatory policy at all.  Hence, the scope of regulation  can be restricted severely by limited
commitment  ability.
To this point, the commitment  ability of the regulator has been treated  as an exogenous
variable.  In practice, it is often endogenous  to some  extent. For i! stance, recall that it may be
difficult for a  regulator to  solicit funds  from private investors because of  the threat of21
government  expropriation. This threat can be reduced through  careful choice of technology  and
institutional  structure.  To illustrate, consider the telecommunications  industry.  Even though
long distance telephone service may be provided most inexpensively  by laying subterranean
fiber-optic  cables, it may be preferable to provide  the service  using satellites. Because sateUites
are readily redeployed for alternative uses, a threat  of governmert  expropriation  can be reduced
by the credible counter-threat  of refusing to use the satellites  to provide long distance telephone
service if the government engages in expropriation.
A threat of government expropilation  or nationalization  can also be limited  by providing
many citizens with a  sizeable stake in the profitable operation of  the regulated firm.  For
instance, if ownership shares in the regulated  firm are widely dispersed, many citizens will be
upset and will lobby the government  to change policy  if any attempt is made to nationalize  the
regulated  firm or unduly restrict its profits. Thus, a widespread  distribution  of ownership shares
can create a natural constituency  for the ongoing  success  of the regulated firm, thereby adding
credibility  to claims that private investment  in the firm will not be expropriated." 0
A regulator's commitment powers can also be enhanced directly.  If a  regulator is
appointed  to a relatively long term rather than  elected directly  by citizens for a short period of
dme, the regulator will be insulated to some  degree from direct consumer  pressure.  Similarly,
if regulatory  appointments are based on training, experience,  and credentials rather than party
affiliation  or political views, an environment  of greater autonomy  for regulators may  be fostered.
B.  Complementary Control Instruments.
An additional aspect of  a country's institutional structure that affects the design of
regulatory  policy is the set of complementary  control instruments  that is in place.  The set of22
complementary  instruments  includes  other governmental  rule-making  bodies, private  rule-making
bodies, and the legal system.
Other  relevant  governmental  rule-making  bodies include bodies  like the Internal  Revenue
Service (IRS), the Securities  and Exchange  Commission  (SEC), the Federal  Trade Commission
(FTC), the Consumer  Product Safety Commission  (CPSC), and the Antitrust Division  of The
Department  of Justice (DOJ) in the United States.  The IRS, the SEC, and comparable  bodies
in other countries develop rules for calculating and reporting profits, which can free other
regulators from this task. Among the many roles of the FTC is ensuring  the veracity  of claims
that firms make to their customers. When truthful advertising  is enforced, a regulator may be
better able to rely on consumers  to discipline  the regulated  firm, so the regulator  can move  away
from command-and-control  regulation  and delegate decision-making  to the firm. Because  bodies
like the CPSC oversee the safety of products that are sold to consumers,  other regulators can
focus their efforts on different  aspects of the firm's operations, such as least-cost  production.
Similarly, because  bodies like the DOJ enforce rules which govern the interactions  among  firms
in an industry, other regulators may not need to  develop particular expertise in this area,
permitting more of a focus on other elements of production.
Thus, the presence of  other governmental rule-making bodies influence the  form,
function, and scope of regulatory policy.  In particular, with other conr  u-ls imposed  by other
bodies, a regulator may  pursue more targeted, partial forms of regulation  instead  of regulation
that is comprehensive  and that controls all aspects of a firm's operations. In addition, though,
a regulator may have  to alter elements  of his most desired regulatory  plan because  of the control
exercised  by other goveming  bodies. For instance, suppose  a body like the CPSC  imposes  much23
higher safety standards on the products sold by the regulated firm than the regulator would
impose if he controlled all aspects of the firm's operations. If the higher safety standards are
more costly to satisfy, then the regulator may have to authorize  prices for the firm's pjroducts
that are higher than the regulator would prefer.  Similarly, if a governing  body like the DOJ
i-sists that the regulated product be supplied  by multiple  producers even though the regulator
would  prefer a single producer, then the regulator may be compelled  to worry about new aspects
of the firms' operations, such as the extent to which their services differ.  In particular,  the
r-gulator may wish to ensure that consumers  can freely switch  among the services of different
suppliers, and  that  different  products  are  compatible with  each  other." 1 Thus,  new
considerations may arise when there are  multiple bodies that oversee a  firm's  operations,
including  tlhe  coo;dination of policy among  the overseers." 2
These new considerations will arise even if the  "other regulators'  are  not official
government  bodLes. The presence of professional  governing bodies (like the rule-making  arm
of the American Medical Association,  for example) that establish accreditation  requirements,
codes of conduct, and  disciplinary measures for its members can  fundamentally alter the
regulator's activities. The regulator may serve solely to enforce the edicts of the professional
governing  body, or it may serve a consultive  role when policy  is formulated. Alternatively,  the
regulator  may serve a reactive role, vetoing those rules suggested  by the professional  governing
body that do not further the regulator's goals and objectives.  For instance, a regulator may
strike down an industry ban on advertising  of prices when the regulator wishes to enhance the
ability of consumers  to switch suppliers  and thereby limit the earnings of suppliers.
The ability of consumers to discipline  suppliers in a regulated  industry can depend on24
another aspect of the institutional  structure in a country ... the ease of consumer  access to the
legal  system.  When consumers can  easily recover  damages for losses  suffered due to
inappropriate  behavior  by the regulated  supplier (e.g., illegal price discrimination,  unscheduled
interruption  of service, supply  of unsafe products, etc.), the regulator may tend to rely more on
consumers  to monitor  the firm's activities  and to discipline the firm for inappropriate  behavior.
When court fees are very high relative to consumers' incomes, when plaintiffs must wait for
long periods of time before their cases are heard, when the court is perceived to favor  industry
over consumer interests, and when compensation  for personal loss is minimal, however, the
regulator will be less likely to rely on self-interested  use of the legal system by consumers  to
discipline the regulated firm.  Instead, the regulator may monitor the  firm's performance
directly, or establish  an intemal complaint and penalty system that encourages  consumers  to
report perceived service  deficiencies  directly to the regulator.' 3
In summary, institutions and complementary  control instruments can have important
effects on the form, function,  and scope of regulatory  policy.  If institutions  limit a regulator's
commitment  powers, the regulator  may be unable  to fashion rules that have  pronounced  impacts
on the behavior  of the regulated firm.  This can limit the scope of regulatory  activity, and can
restrict  the  regulator's  function to  informing consumers  rather  than  enforcing policy.
Complementary  control instruments  can serve to limit the scope of regulatory  policy  because  of
divided  areas of responsibility. They can also affect the form and function of regulatory  policy
by altering the perceived  costs 2nd benefits of regulations.
5.  Industry  Conditiors.
The purpose of this section is to explain how a variety of industry conditions can25
influence  the form, function, and scope of regulatory  policy.  The indusuy conditions that are
considered include the  production technology, the  nature of  consumer demand, and  the
information  structure  in the industry.
A.  The Production Tech iology.
The production  technology in an industry specifies the manner in which inputs (e.g.,
capital, labor, and raw materials) can be transformed into final products and services.  The
production  technology  influences  the form, function, and scope of regulatory  policy in number
of important  ways.  For instance, it affects the likely number of suppliers  of regulated  services,
and thus the rules which govern their interaction. It also influences  the array of services that
are regulated.
When the production  technology  exhibits increasing  returns to scale, so that the unit cost
of supplying  a regulated  product declines  as the production  level increases,  minimal production
costs entail supply  by a single producer. Effective  regulatory  policy can be quite different when
there is only a single supplier in the industry than when there are a number  of suppliers. With
only one supplier there is no natural benchmark  against which the firm's performance  can be
compared. Thus, the regulator's task of determining  reasonable  performance  requirements  and
compensation  levels for the regulated  firm becomes more difficult.  Also, the regulator cannot
rely on the discipline  that might otherwise  be provided by consumers  as they switch suppliers
when one fails to perform adequately.  Consequently,  when economies  of scale dictate supply
by a single firm, the regulator must often engage  in lengthy, detailed  investigations  of the firm's
operations  before it can fashion reasonable  regulatory  rulings. Thus, the production  technology
can have  direct  bearing  on various aspects  of the form of regulatory  policy, including  the manner26
in which policy is formulated.
Note, though, that the presence  of economies  of scale does not preclude the possibility
of multiple suppliers in an industry. A regulator may  intentionally  permit production by two or
more producers even thou,-h a single producer could serve all demand at lower cost."4 The
extra costs incurred when two or more firms produce may be outweighed by the benefits  that
result from competition  among suppliers. Competition  can force suppliers to reduce prices to
consumers below the levels a regulator who was uncertain about the true capabilities of a
monopoly  supplier  would  enforce. Competition  can also spur more rapid product innovation  and
induce the supply of higher quality products.
Whether the absence of economies  of scale leads naturally to multiple producers or
whether a regulator decides to encourage  supply by multiple producers despite the presence  of
scale economies, the form, function,  and scope of regulatory  policy can be quite different  when
there are multiple  suppliers  of a product  than  when there is only one supplier.  For example,  the
regulator may rely less  heavily on  command-and-control  regulation to  dictate the  firm's
activities.  Instead, competition  among suppliers may be employed to motivate them to act in
the best interests of consumers  (e.g., to keep prices close to minimum  possible costs).  When
competition prevails, the regulator's role may be  more to inform consumers about firms'
activities and  their  performance than to  dictate specific actions and  performance levels
directly.5 In addition, the regulator may take actions to support the activities of developing
firms (e.g., subsidize  the research and development  or the infrastructure development  of these
firms) to ensure they can ultimately  function as viable competitors.' 6 The regulator may also
enhance  the ability of consumers  to switch  from one supplier to another (by prohibiting  fees for27
switching suppliers or  requiring that  all  products  supplied  by  regulated producers w
technologically  compatible,  for example).  '  All of these activities  can strengthen the effects of
competition in the industry, thereby lessening  the need for direct regulatory oversight.
If he doesn't act to facilitate  direct market-based  competition  among multiple  suppliers,
the regulator  can create competitive  pressures  among suppliers  in other ways.  For instance, the
regulator may devise compensation  programs based on relative performance criteria."  The
firm that achieves  the lowest costs of production  in the industry or the highest  level of pr.)duct
quality may be permitted  to earn higher profits, for example. Of course, the regulator needs to
correct  for innate differences among suppliers when designing such relative performance
policies.  For instance, in  the electric power industry, if some firms have more abundant
supplies  of water power in their operating regions than others, these firms may have a natural
cost advantage  in generating  electricity  that must be accounted for.
Actual competition  is not always necessary to discipline an incumbent  supplier.  The
threat of potential competition can induce a firm to minimize production costs and enhance
product quality.  9 Regulatory  form can be st:ructured  to take full advantage  of this threat.  For
instance, a firm's right to serve as a monopoly  supplier may be limited to a prespecified  period
of time.  At the end of the specified  time period, the right to serve consumers  may be auctioned
off to the highest bidder, or consumers might vote on whether to renew the license of the
incumbent supplier or to procure service from a new supplier. 20 The threat of losing one's
franchise can provide strong motivation  to perform diligently.
Sound reasons do exist, though, to limit the reliance of regulatory policy on actual or
potential competition.  Recall that one of the many potential objectives of regulators is to28
promote more equitable outcomes.  At times, this objective  can be achieved most readily ty
prohibiting production of  regulated services by  fir.s  other than the  incumbent monopoly
supplier.  To illustrate, consider the telecommunications  industry.  In some jurisdictions, the
policy of implementing  relatively high prices on long-distance  telephone  calls has been adopted
in order to allow the monopoly supplier of telecommunications  services to earn a reasonable
level ef profits while keeping the price of access to the telephone  network and the price of local
telephone  calls relatively low.  The purpose of this policy is to ensure that even citizens with
very low levels of income can afford to purchase basic telephone  service.
A policy of using enharced revenues from one service to offset limited revenues from
another service can be  undermined when unrestricted entry into the regulated industry is
permitted.  If prices from long-distance  telephone  service are set well in excess of costs while
prices for local telephone  service  are set below cost, a competitor may wish to supply  only long-
distance telephone service at a price that is less than or equal to the price charged by the
regulated supplier.  While such supply may be profitable for the entrant and welcomed by
consumers  of long-distance  service, it can leave  the incumbent  supplier  with insufficient  revenues
to offset the losses incurred in providing  local telephone  service.  Consequently,  the intentional
regulatory policy of cross subsidization  will not be compatible  with unfettered entry into the
industry.
Of course, regulatory policy can sometimes  be redesigned to  take advantage of the
benefits of competition  while continuing  to promote such social goals as income redistribution.
For instance, in the telecommunications  setting  just described, new suppliers of long-distance
telephone  service might be charged  a fee for the right to operate. The revenues from these fees29
could be employed to offset some of the financial  burden borne by the incumbent  supplier in
providing local telephone  service at uneconomic  rates.  Alternatively,  new entrants might be
required to provide some  local telephone  service if they wish to supply  long-distance  service. 2"
A third possibility  might be to restructure  regulated  prices. For instance,  when competitors  are
allowed to supply long-distance  service, it may not be advisable to attempt to keep the price of
telephone service below cost for all customers.  Only those customers with particularly low
income (e.g., those who participate  in other government  assistance  programs)  might be eligible
for a deeply discounted  price for local telephone  service.  It is important that alternatives  like
these be considered when  technological  change renders competition  feasible. The choice facing
regulators is not simply  whether unfettered  competition  should be allowed  or prohibited,  taking
existing regulatory policy as given.  Regulators must determine whether competition  coupled
with appropriate changes  in regulatory  policy  can better meet regulatory  objectives  than can the
best regulatory policy that prohibits competition.
The production technology  also influences the proper scope of regulatory oversight.
Often there are many  components  of the service provided  by regulated  suppliers. For instance,
the supply of electric power involves  both the generation of electricity  and its transmission  to
cuscomers. While a regulator might oversee  all elements  of production  in some circumstances,
he might regulate only a subset  of the components  in other circumstances. In particular, suppose
the producticn technology  is such that: (1) total production costs are no higher when different
firrns produce the different components  of a service than when a  single firm produces all
components; and (2) there are limited economies  of scale in producing one or  more of the
components (e.g.,  the  generation of  electricity).  The best  regulatory policy under these30
conditions  may involve deregulation  of the components  for which  there are limited economies
of scale (e.g., electricity generation) while maintaining  regulatory  control over the operations
of the monopoly  supplier of the components  of service  characterized  by pronounced  economies
of scale (e.g., electricity transmission). Such a policy  can take advantage  of both the benefits
of competition  and the cost savings provided by scale economies.
Of course, new considerations  arise when some components  of production are regulated
and other components  are not regulated. For instance,  in the electricity  example  just described,
it is important  that the regulated  producer of transmission  services  not grant special favors and
privileges to an unregulated but affiliated subsidiary that generates electricity.  A policy that
mandates  symmetric  treatment of all potential  input suppliers  can be advisable  in such a setting.
Special precautions may also be  needed to ensure an adequate supply of  quality.  When
components  of a service are provided by different  suppliers,  it may  be difficult to discern which
supplier  is to blame when an inadequate level of quality is delivered. For instance, it may not
always  be trivial to determine whether an unscheduled  power outage  is caused by the failure of
a  generating firm  to  supply the  amount of  power it piomised or  by  problems with  the
transmission  facilities.  When all aspects of electricity supply are conducted  by a sing!e firm,
it can be less important for a regulator to pinpoint the exact source of a problem.  If the single
regulated firm is  held financially responsible for any reduction in quality, the firm can be
induced to determine the source of and eliminate quality problems.  In contrast, when the
regulated  firm supplies only a component  of the regulated  service, the regulator will not want
to penalize the firm for quality problems  that are caused  by other suppliers  and that are beyond
the control of the regulated firm.  Thus, it may be important to develop better monitoring31
technologies to determine the source of quality problems or take other steps to avoid quality
problems when the different components of a  regulated product are  supplied by different
producers.
B.  Consumer Demand.
A second feature of  the industry that can affect the  form, function, and scope of
regulatory policy is the nature of the regulated product and its consumers.  If the regulated
product is a basic commodity  that is considered  essential for everyday  life, society may wish to
ensure the product is available in abundant supply on reasonable  terms to all citizens.  Clean
water and electricity are examples  of these essential products in many countries.  Conatumers
often have inelastic demand  for these essential  services, since they would  be willing  to pay large
sums of money for these services. To avoid expropriation  of consumers  with inelastic  demand,
regulation which limits the price a firm can charge for an essential service can be useful. This
is particularly  true when economies  of scale render production  by a single  firm most economical,
so the limits on price increases  naturally imposed  by competition  are not available. In contrast,
if the product in question is more  of a luxury than a necessity, consumers  will tend to purchase
the product only if its price is sufficiently  low, which puts a natural limit on the ability of the
producer to expropriate consumers.
The presence of externalities  in consumption  can also influence  the form, function,  and
scope  of regulation. To illustrate,  take the case  of communicable  diseases. Individual  members
of society may have insufficient  incentive  to consume  the vaccine  if no regulations  are imposed,
particularly if an individual does not take into account the potential adverse consequences  for
others if he contracts the disease.  Therefore, regulations may be designed which require all32
individuals  to consume the vaccine.  The government may also subsidize  this consumption,
particularity  if income redistribution  is an important  goal of govemment. Reguiations  may  also
be imposed  to limit activities that involve negative externalities.  For instance, limits on the
amount of pollutants  a firm is allowed to expel in the course of production  are common.
Consumer  characteristics  can also influence  the form, function,  and scope of regulatory
policy. To illustrate, the small physical size and undeveloped  mental  capacities  of children are
often thought to  warrant special  protection for  children that is  not extended to  adults.
Government  agencies  designed  to limit child abuse are not uncommon,  and regulations  are often
imposed  that limit  the activities of minors (e.g., voting, consuming  alcohol,  and enlisting  in the
military). 0.milarly, the need to regulate products purchased mainly by large, sophisticated,
well-informed  businesses may be less pronounced than if the most common purchaser is a
relatively  unsophisticated,  uninformed  household. Sophisticated  purchasers  are often better able
to  secure substitutes for  products whose announced price  is  considered to  be  too high.
Furthermore, a purchaser who has the potential to buy many units of the product often has a
stronger  position  from which to bargain for concessions  from the supplier  relative to a purchaser
who, at most, will consume a negligible fraction of the supplier's sales.
C.  Information Structure.
The information  structure in an industry is another important  determinant  of the forn,
function,  and scope of regulatory policy.  When critical information  is difficult for consumers
to  discern, and  when there  are  large  economies of  scale in  information collection and
dissemination,  a natural  role emerges for the regulator  as an information  provider. For example,
consider a setting where it  is difficult for consumers  to evaluate the safety of a product (e.g.,33
a new medicine) unless they actually purchase and use the product, but where safety can he
ascertained  fairly easily by trained experts  operating under  controlled conditions  in a laboratory.
In such a setting, social resources can be conserved and the sale of unsafe products can be
avoided if a testing facility  is established  and firms are not allowed to sell products  that do not
pass the safety tests conducted  at the facility.  In this instance, where a central authority can
collect relevant information  at a relatively low cost while consumers face prohibitive  costs of
collecting the information, the form and function of regulatory policy will often encompass
centralized monitoring  and enforcement  of standards.
In other instances, it may be relatively inexpensive for consumers to discern relevant
product information, but prohibitively  costly for a central authority (like the government)  to do
so.  For example, consumers may be readily able to observe the courtesy, timeliness, and
attention  with which services are delivered, while a person who is not party to the transaction
may be unable to accurately  observe these  aspects of delivered  service.  In such circumstances,
centralized monitoring  and control will be prohibitively  costly and/or ineffective  at enhancing
the courtesy, timeliness, and attention with which services are delivered.  A more effective
policy would employ the information  that consumars  receive naturally at little or no cost.  Such
a policy might set up a facility to receive and record consumer complaints and penalize the
regulated supplier more harshlv the larger the number of complaints received, for example.'
Alternatively, regulatory policy might provide consumers with  information  about potential
altemative suppliers, thereby encouraging consumers to  abandon  suppliers that  provide
inadequate service.  Thus, the same regulatory goal of promoting high-quality  service and
products is best achieved through  different  regulatory form and function when the relative costs34
of information  acquisition  differ.
The costs of acquiring  information  affect the form, function,  and scope  of regulation  in
other ways. For instance,  when it is very costly to measure key dimensions  of certain  activities,
proxies may be measured  and controlled instead.  To illustrate, a common goal in industrial
settings is to limit  the pollutants  firms expel during production. In theory, these  pollutants  could
be limited either by taxing  firms for each unit c  ,ollution expelled, or by prohibiting  pollution
in excess of a specified  level. In practice it can be very costly, if not impossible,  to accurately
measure the amount of pollution expelled by a firm.  Consequently,  alternative methods of
control are commonly  employed.  One popular method is to dictate the amount and type of
pollution  abatement  equipment  that must be installed. It has been common  in the past to require
electric utilities  to install industrial scrubbers to help purify the exhaust  that is released  into the
atmosphere. In addition, restrictions have been placed on the type of inputs (e.g., hard coal
versus soft  coal) that  can be used in the production  process. These indirect  forms of control  can
be more effective  than the direct control of pollution itself when the costs of monitoring  and
enforcing direct control are prohibitive.
The locus of information  in an industry can also affect another dimension  of regulatory
form: the nature of the regulatory process.  When many individuals oti.,r than the regulator
possess information  that is relevant for making decisions, it can be important  to have an open
regulatory  process  in which  many individuals  are afforded he opportunity  to proviue  information
to the regulator before regulatory policy is determined.  Most hearings to set prices for public
utilities in the United States  are open to all interested  parties, and consumer  grcups commonly
supply information  about consumer preferences while producers supply information about35
production  costs. In contrast, when all relevant  information  is known to the regulator, the need
for open hearings may be less pressing.  If little relevant information is revealed during a
lengthy, open regulatory process, such a process may serve more to retard than to inform the
design of regulatory policy.'
The most appropriate regulatory  process will also depend on the pace of technological
change in the regulated  industry.  Rapid technological  change can make it very difficult for a
regulator (particularly one with limited resources, as explained in  section 3) to remain well
informed  about all aspects of the actual and potential  activities  of the regulated  firm.  Although
lengthy  hearings and investigations  to improve the regulator's information  can be valuable, thcy
can also be very costly. In particular, they can slow the introduction  of new products and new
pricing structures  that better reflect production  costs. Sometimes, unregulated  competitors  can
intentionally  prolong hearings in order to reduce  the speed with which the regulated  supplier  can
respond to competitive pressures.  Consumers can be hurt by  this process, and inefficient
industry structures can result.
Regulatory form and scope can be structured to avoid such problems.  In particular,
greater decision-making  authority can be delegated  to the regulated firm.  This delegation  can
come in the form of allowing  the firm to choose one compensation  plan from a well-structured
menu of alternative compensation  plans (as described  in section 3), or by coupling  less ex ante
scrutiny  of the firm's proposed  activities  with more  severe penalties (e.g., lower prices or lower
allowed rates of return) if observed industry performance differs markedly from the firm's
predictions.
In summary, industry conditions  can have important  impacts  on the form, function,  and36
scope of regulatory  policy. The production technology in an industry  can influence  the exte't
of competition that is feasible. The extent of competition, in turn, can have profound effects
on  policy design.  The characteristics  of  consumers and  the products they consume help
determine whether the proper role for the regulator is an informing  role or an enforcing role.
The information structure in an industry also influences this calculation, and, in  addition,
influences  how much decision-making  authority the regulator should delegate to other parties.
6.  Conclusions.
The purpose of this  research was to explore some of the principles  that  govern the design
of  regulatory policy.  Three key factors that influence the  form, function, and scope of
regulatory policy were identified  and analyzed.  These factors are regulatory objectives and
resources, the institutional  structure  of the environment  for which regulatory  policy is designed,
and various industry conditions  in the regulated  environment.
Different regulatory objectives were argued to  have direct effects on  the types of
regulatory controls that are imposed. When very focused, specific  objectives are paramount,
for example, the form, function, and scope of regulatory policy may be similarly focused.
Limited resources can also affect the nature of regulatory  activities. They can cause regulation
to  be more reactive than proactive, and lead to  substantial delegation of decision-making
authority.
The institutional  structure  of the country in which regulation is imposed can affect the
regulator's commitment  ability.  The form, function, and scope of regulatory policy can be
severely restricted when the regulator has limited ability to  deliver promised rewards or
threatened penalties. The proper scope and function of regulation may also be fairly limited37
when technological  conditions  allow competition  to discipline  producers.  Sophisticated  buyers
with economic power can also reduice  the need for regulatory  control, and rapid technological
change can render comprehensive  command-and-control  regulation ineffective  or debilitating.
For expository purposes, the discussion  in this paper has isolated individual influerces
on regulatory policy.  In practice, the effects identified here and many others all influence
simultaneously  the proper formulation  of regulatory  policy. The simultaneous  operation of all
these forces is what makes regulatory  design an intricate  and complex undertaking.
In closing, some additional  influences  on observed  regulatory policy that were afforded
inadequate  attention here are briefly noted.  Inertia is one such influence.  Often, regulatory
controls that served an important  purpose  at one point in time persist even though they no longer
serve their intended  purpose.  The controls can persist because they favor a particular group or
constituency,  and that constituency  is able to convince  the regulator  to keep the controls in place.
For instance, subsidies to firms and tariff protection  against competing imports often continue
long after they have served the intended purpose of promoting the development of an infant
industry. The firms that benefit from the subsidies  and protection  have every incentive to argue
for their continuance, even though the firms are fully capable of competing against foreign
producers.  When there is limited public outcry against continuing  the special treatment, and
strong urging by the affected firms for its continuance, the regulator may be convinced to
continue the treatment, even though it no longer serves its intended  purpose.
Regulation  may also be influenced  by the personal  ambitions  of regulators. Even though
a regulator may be charged with protecting consumers, he may be diverted from this goal by
promises of personal rewards for favorable  treatment  offered  by the regulated  firm.  In this way,38
the regulator may be captured by the regulated  firm, and so the form, function, and scope of
regulation may not properly reflect the goals and objectives  of society as a whole.  2
Regulations may also be influenced  by personal goals and objectives  of regulators that,
while differing from perceived  social goals, are not motivated  by self interest. Regulators may
have genuine differences  of opinion with society at large or with other government officials
about what is best for society. Where goals  and objectives  conflict, the goals that are pursued
depend in large part on the autonomy  regulators  are granted and on the balance  of power among
government  bodies. When attempting  to understand  the form, function,  and scope of regulatory
activity, it is important  to understand  the entire structure of government  influence  and control.
Particular  regulations  in particular  industries  are often  partial, interdependent  components  of this
more comprehensive  structure.FOOTNOTES
1.  To illustrate, the state of Nebraska currently employs  a form of potential regulation in
its telecommunications  industry. The primary provider of telecommunications  services
is not permitted to raise the price of basic local service more than ten percent in any
year.  This  restriction aside,  the operations and perfornance  of  the  firm are  not
controlled  by the state's public  utility commission  (PUC)  unless  two percent of the firm's
customers formally complain to the PUC about the firm's activities.  (See Mueller
(1993).)
2.  Development  can take many forms.  For instance,  it may involve  installing state-of-the-
art  technology  (e.g.,  converting  from  analogue  to  digital  switches  in  the
telecommunications  industry) or increasing the reliability  of the service provided (e.g.,
installing  back-up transmission facilities that can be employed to carry voice or data
traffic  in  the  event  of  failure  of  the  primary  transmission  facility  in  the
telecommunications  industry).
3.  In  the  United  States'  telecommunications industry,  different  states  encourage
infrastructure development in different ways.  Some states mandate that the regulated
firm make available to rural customers  the same modem  services (e.g., enhanced calling
capabilities and features like call waiting and caller identification)  that the firm finds
profitable to offer to urban customers.  Other states are less specific in their mandates,
but do require the regulated firm to reinvest a portion of its earnings in infrastructure
development.  This  development commonly takes the  form of  converting copper
transmission  lines to fiber lines, and replacing  analogue  switches  with digital switches.40
4.  Some might argue that this sequential  approach  to meeting multiple  objectives  has been
pursued in the telecommunications  industry in the United States.  In the early 1900's,
regulation of the telecommunications  industry focused on providing reliable telephone
service and interconnection  capabilities  to as many customers as possible.  (Initially,
telephone service was provided by different companies, and the customers of one
company were not able to  call or  receive calls from  the customers of  a  different
company.)  By the  mid 1900's, interconnection  capabilities had been ensured, and
regulators had turned their attention  toward  limiting  the profits of the monopoly  provider
of telecommunications  services.  (Mueller, 1993, pp.  13-14)
5.  This policy is discussed in great.;r detail in Sappington and Sibley (1992).  Also see
Brown and Sibley (1986), Sibley (1989), and Wilson (1993).
6.  The U.S.  Federal Communications  Commission allows the local exchange carriers
(LEC's) to choose among different  methods  of compensation  for their interstate access
charges.  If the LEC's choose to reduce their average (inflalion-adjusted)  access charges
by  3.3%  annually, they share with consumers fifty percent of  their earnings that
constitute a rate of return on capital between 12.25  % and 16.25  %.  All earnings above
16.25% are  returned to customers under this plan.  If, however, a LEC chooses to
guarantee a higher 4.3% annual real reduction  in average access rates, the firm is only
required to share fifty percent of its earnings that represents a rate of return between
13.25  % and 17.25  %.  Only if earnings  rise above a 17.25  % return are they al  awarded
to consumers. Thus, a LEC can secure the opportunity  to retain more of its earnings  by
guaranteeing lower prices  to  its  customers.  (For  additional details, see  Federal41
Communications  Commission, 1990.)
7.  For additional thoughts  on how a regulator with limited information  should design the
set of options he offers to a regulated  firm, see Baron (1988), Besanko  and Sappington
(1987), Caillaud  et al. (1988), Laffont and Tirole (1993), or Sappington  (1991).
8.  For instance,  if the regulatoiy goal is simply to ensure that consumers  are not misled by
false advertising, the regulator can focus on developing  the ability to assess the veracity
of  advertisements and  to  impose penalties (e.g.,  monetary fines) when misleading
advertising  is identified. In contrast, if the regulator wishes  to protect consumers  more
broadly, for example by ensuring that they are able to secure high-quality  service at low
prices, then a more elaborate system of regulation will generally  be required (e.g., a
system to monitor quality and to limit prices to 'reasonable" levels).
9.  For a detailed  analysis of the interaction  between the properties  of a country's institutions
(such as the strength of its judiciary) and the design of regulatory  policy for the country,
see Levy and Spiller (1993, 1994).
10.  See Levy and Spiller (1993), and Vickers and Yarrow (1988)  for additional  thoughts  on
this matter.
11.  For an overview  of the many regulatory  considerations  associated  with the compatibility
issue, see Besen and Saloner (1990), for example.
12.  See Baron (1985)  for one formal treatment of this issue. Baron's analysis  illustrates  the
important observation that losses to  society can result when regulatory policy is not42
properly coordinated  across regulatory  agencies. Thus, in addition to designing  the b  ;t
policy for a particular regulatory body given the policies adopted by other regulatory
bodies, it is important to  ensure that the various regulatory policies are  optimally
coordinated. Such optimal  coordination  can be quite subtle.  Sometimes,  it can be best
to eliminate the duplication of  powers.  (For instance, if  significant resources and
expertise are required to carefully analyze the social benefits and costs of a proposed
merger between two competitors, then it may be best to conserve these resources by
granting a  single regulatory body sole authority to approve or disapprove proposed
mergers.) In other instances,  intentional  duplication  of powers can comprise  part of an
optimal system of checks and balances.  (For example, if  large, powerful firms are
thought  to have  undue influence  over policymakers,  it can be best to disperse  rulemaking
authority, so as to make it more difficult  for the regulated firm to "capture" all relevant
regulators.) (See Sah and Stiglitz  (1986) for additional  thoughts on how the arrangement
of decision-making  authority  can influence  the likelihood  of correct social  decisions  when
government  decision-makers  make mistakes  in judgement  because  the information  at their
disposal  is imperfect.)
13.  In Great Britain, for example, British  Telecom  is obligated to compensate  its customers
directly if the company fails to meet established  service requirements.  For instance,
British Telecom must pay a customer five pounds for every day beyond two that an
actual repair or installation  lags the scheduled  repair or installation.  (See Rovizzi  and
Thompson  (1992).)
14.  See Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983).43
15.  For example, when many banks and mortgage companies compete to provide loans o
homeowners,  a government  may  not need to regulate mortgage  loan rates. Howe'ver,  the
government  might  want to impose  standards  on how the key terms of the mortgage  (e.g.,
the annual rate of interest, the duration of the loan, penalties for premature  repayment
of  the loan, application  fees, and other fees) are  disclosed to consumers.  Standard
reporting formats enable consumers to  better compare the  products of  alternative
suppliers, and can thereby enhance  competition among suppliers.
16.  In the United States, the Small Business Administration  provides low-interest  loans and
counselling  to small businesses,  particularly new entrants. In many industries  (e.g., the
telecommunications  industry), it is common  for governments  to regulate  the activities  of
large incumbent  suppliers,  but to exempt new suppliers from regulatory  scrutiny.
17.  Following the entry of  MCI and Sprint into the  long-distance telecommunications
industry in the United States, the Federal Communications  Commission  imposed rules
that facilitated the ability of consumers  to switch from the incumbent  supplier  of long-
distance service (AT&T) to one of its new competitors.  In particular, consumers  were
permitted (at no charge) to designate  a long-distance  provider other than AT&T  as their
primary  carrier, so that  their long-distance  !  +lephone calls would  automatically  be carried
by the designated  carrier.
18.  See Shleifer (1985) for a theoretical analysis of how to design relative performance
schemes. The Mississippi  Public Service Commission  has implemented  a 'Performance
Evaltl'tion  Plan'  that bases the allowed rate  of  return  for the Mississippi Power44
Company  (MPC) both on the company's own performance  and on the returns earned ly
other comparable  utilities. Under the plan MPC  can earn no more than comparable  firms
earn if MPC's own performance (in terms of residential rates, customer satisfaction,
safety, plant availability,  etc.) is judged to be poor.  However, MPC will be allowed to
earn at least what comparable  firms earn, and often more, if MPC's performance is
judged to be excellent.
19.  See Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982) for a detailed theoretical treatment  of this issue.
20.  See Laffont and Tirole (1988) and Williamson  (1976) for additional thoughts on how
such franchise  policies might be designed.
21.  In the cable television  industry, local municipalities  often require the selected supplier
of cable service to offer public service channels at no additional cost to subscribers,
and/or to provide special services (e.g., special broadcast channels) to local schools  or
community  groups.
22.  In many regulated industries, the punishment for inadequate quality supply is more
implicit than explicit. While most state public service  commissions  in the United States
have a long list of quality standards that telecommunications  providers are supposed  to
meet, it is uncommon  for explicit monetary penalties to be associated with failure to
achieve  the standards. There are exceptions  to this general rule, however. For instance,
in Georgia, the share of its earnings that Southern  Bell is permitted to retain depends
upon its compliance  with specific  quality standards. As noted above, explicit penalties
are also imposed  on British  Telecom for failure to meet service and repair obligations.45
Recall, also, that under the Performance  Evaluation Plan instituted in Mississippi,  the
allowed earnings of the Mississippi  Power Company  are closely linked to its measured
performance  on a variety of dimensions.
23.  To illustrate, when a developing  country's overriding concern is to begin delivery  of a
standard,  essential  service  (e.g., water, electricity, or basic telephone  service)  rather than
to fine-tune  the pricing structure  in a sophisticated  delivery system, an open regulatory
process may provide very little relevant information.
24.  For a mcxe  detailed  discussion  of the capture theory of regulation, see Stigler (1971)  and
Laffont and Tirole (1993).REFERENCES
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